

COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINOLOGY – A REFLECTIVE AND CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO THE RATIONALIST PARADIGM OF FREE WILL

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ABSTRACT: Comprehensive Criminology - A Reflective and Christian Approach to the Rationalist Paradigm of Free Will.

As I pointed out in my previous article* *Comprehensive Criminology*, elaborated by George C. Basiliade - published by Expert Publishing House, in 2006 and awarded the Romanian Academy Prize *Simion Bărnuțiu/2006* - is not only an encyclopedic treatise, unique in the Romanian specialized literature, but also the support of an original conception of the epistemology of crime, almost unique in European and international thought. Unfortunately, this work continues to remain insufficiently known and insignificantly integrated into the academic circuit. Jurist, psychologist, philosopher, George C Basiliade fulfils his training and vision as a criminologist against the backdrop of an active interdisciplinarity and an evident Christian spirituality, which ennobles his work. In his epistemological analysis, configured diachronically, the Romanian criminologist projects two main paradigms, which precede the constitution of criminology as a science: the „empirical organicist paradigm” and the „rationalist paradigm of free will”, while detecting the dynamics of specific tensions between them. All the points of view relating to organic nature (somatic, anatomical-physiological, morpho-functional) are subsumed in a theoretical-explanatory and methodological model, which the author has called the „empirical organicist paradigm”. It will be at the origin of attempts to explain the phenomenon of crime, other than through its relationship with the prohibited act and the ‚forces of evil’ which generated ‚original sin’. These attempts, underpinned by the scientism characteristic of the 19th century and supplemented by theories on the evolution of species and the relationship between the organogenesis and sociogenesis of human behaviour, will make some contributions to the construction of criminology as a relatively autonomous scientific discipline. The „rationalist paradigm of free will”, which we propose to analyse mainly in this article, congruently includes both theological and philosophical

meanings, that form an explanatory model. From the complexity of the rationalist paradigm of free will, we have proposed to select some of the theological positions, which Basiliade goes through, considering that they are a „sui-generis” value, which gives to the treatise *Comprehensive Criminology* an original and reducible epistemological potential, revealing the Romanian researcher’s propensity towards Christian spirituality and the understanding of its contribution to the constitution of criminology. The Romanian criminologist’s assertion is symptomatic: „Authentic mysticism is a complementary alternative to human rationality and results from transgressing the limits of current understanding. It does not cancel the reflective capacity of the human being - on the contrary - it reveals, through a dialectic of complementarity, a dimension of rationality, actualized in exceptional cases in the conscience of the believer”¹

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George Basiliade argues in his treatise, *Comprehensive Criminology*, that *the emergence and establishment of criminology as a scientific discipline was preceded by certain preoccupations that characterized the spirit of the times, namely the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries.* The author reveals a series of advances in knowledge, from which the first attempts to develop an explanation of the genesis of criminal behaviour were structured:

- a) the proliferation and diversification of medical studies, as part of a continuous process of development of the sciences about man and nature, studies marked by attempts to explain the origins of mental illness and some differential elements in the social treatment of deviant behaviour;
- b) a retrospective analysis of certain philosophical and theological concepts concerning knowledge, morality and the relationship between certain endogenous or exogenous factors and individual decisions as expressions of a free will;
- c) preliminary reflections on the idea of responsibility and the role of punishment as a reaction of society to prohibited acts.

In his epistemological analysis, configured diachronically, Geoge Basiliade projects two main paradigms that precede the constitution of

1 George-Mircea Botescu, „Comprehensive Criminology - A Teleological and Hermeneutical Perspective on Criminal Behaviours”, în *Jurnalul Libertății de Conștiință*, vol.9, nr. 2, Les Arcs, France, Editions IARSIC, 2021, pp. 506-518.

criminology as a science, which he calls *the rationalist paradigm of free will* and *the empirical organicist paradigm*, detecting the dynamics and impact of specific tensions between them.

All views on organic nature (somatic, anatomical-physiological, morpho-functional) are subsumed under a theoretical-explanatory and methodological model, which George Basiliade has designated as the “empirical organicist paradigm”. According to him, it is at the origin of attempts to explain the criminal phenomenon other than through its relationship with the prohibited act and the forces of evil which generated the original sin. These attempts *supported by the scientism characteristic of the 19th century and supplemented by some theories concerning the evolution of species and the relationship between the organogenesis and sociogenesis of human behaviour will mark some contributions to the establishment of criminology as a relatively autonomous scientific discipline.*

The “rationalist paradigm of free will”, in a broad sense, congruently encompassing both theological and philosophical meanings, configures a theoretical-explanatory and methodological model, which Basiliade describes in the following logically consistent, congruent and marked by completeness statements:

- Rationality, as a fundamental attribute of man, consists in the pre-disposition or operative capacity of the intellect, as the totality of mental functions, to logically structure mental activity and implicitly the contents of consciousness, according to the purposes of the occasional or lasting, simple or complex actions of the human being.
- Free will and implicit freedom of the will are attributes of rationality, provided that it is not affected by a pathological, disabling condition or by external constraints, which decisively influence selection, choice and decision, as stages in the liberation of most human actions, more or less important, and give rise to responsibility for the acts committed.
- The main operative criteria of ‘free will’, in which ‘freedom of the will’ is manifested as freedom of choice and as a prerequisite for human acts, are of an axiological nature.
- Religious or secular moral values and legal values are the main objects of rational, affective and volitional acts, as acts of conscience (moral conscience, religious conscience, conscience of rights and obligations) and as discriminatory and optional grounds for free will.

Out of the complexity of the rationalist paradigm of free will or freedom of the will, we set out to analyze some of the theological positions that Basiliade investigates, considering that they are a “sui-generis” element of the Comprehensive Criminology treatise, which gives it an original and reducible epistemological potential, marking the author’s propensity towards Christian spirituality and the understanding of its historical contribution to the constitution of criminology.

If in the case of mental illnesses, it is considered that one acts under the “empire” of foreign forces that turn him into an “alien” independent of his will, in the case of criminals, it is presumed the existence of “freedom of the will”, and consequently, of “free will” as a rational faculty to choose good and evil and to decide, in full knowledge of the facts, the orientation of one’s own actions. From this perspective, George Basiliade constructs a complex analysis of the “free will” and implicitly of the “freedom of the will”, by resorting to a fragmentary but significant historical analysis of the functions attributed to them in the genesis of human behavior by theological and philosophical thought, in the centuries preceding the constitution of criminology as a science.

The author of the treatise *COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINOLOGY* specifies, from a semantic perspective, that one of the ways of manifesting free will - translated into a non-theological language - is the discernment. He argues that this concept is roughly the psychological equivalent of what, in the science of criminal law, has led to the differentiation of the legal reaction to perpetrators who have acted without discernment and to those who had the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the crime. Based on this analogy, George Basiliade carries out a substantial and original philosophical analysis: *Free will and implicit freedom of will are the expression of the rationality of the human being and reflect one of the ontological sides of the idea of freedom.* According to this point of view “free will or freedom of the will can only be eliminated or altered by a pathological state that is disabling for human rationality, or by the psychological effects of an external constraint that blocks or annihilates freedom of the will”.

For nuance, George Basiliade critically analyzes the way this situation is presented by Jaques Lacan, in a psychoanalytic approach to the origins of mental illness. The French psychoanalyst points out that “the human being not only cannot be understood without madness but would not be a human being if he did not carry madness as the limit of his freedom”.

Although interesting and seductive as a formulation, the Lacanian point of view is considered by George Basiliade as hazardous. The Romanian criminologist interprets this idea of limit “not as a point of maximum extension of human freedom, but as a barrier from which freedom of will ceases to be a dimension proper to man”. There are cases of mental pathology that affect the intellect and rationality specific to the human being. Insofar as “free will and discernment imply the freedom to differentiate, to choose and to decide, the subsequent problem is that of action, which necessarily implies an act of will”.

In this context, Basiliade formulates a question with strong epistemic implications: Can one speak of a “freedom of the will” when the volitional act from which human action results appears in a deterministic context as an effect of deliberation and free will? Rephrasing, Basiliade adds: *Can the existence of a free and autonomous will be sustained if it is dependent on the choices and decisions of free will?*

The question is not considered by the author to be rhetorical, asking for a plausible answer that would remove the causal relationship between free will and the freedom of the will.

Continuing the demonstrative thread of the analysis, Basiliade considers that the idea of an absolute freedom of the human being must be eliminated. Will as an act of consciousness or as a process is always conditioned by a series of neurophysiological parameters, that regulate or deregulate activity. At the same time, its manifestation is influenced by biological and social factors, even in situations where they do not play a decisive role in triggering the volitional process. “On the one hand, free will itself involves a series of volitional mechanisms that enter into the psychological process of deliberation, i.e. of choice and decision making prior to rational human actions”. At this level of the the development of demonstrative reasoning, Basiliade configures a significant and original dissociation: *it can be said that between free will and freedom of will there is not a relation of causality but of implication. Free will implies freedom of the will and makes both phrases designate a unitary psychic process.* In the researcher’s opinion, the use of one or the other of these phrases only emphasizes either the volitional or the optional and decisional side of the same deliberative mechanism of rational activity. The semantic connotations, in German and English, are eloquent in this respect, “Willensfreiheit” and “Freedom of Will”.

Basiliade points out that the idea of free will has its origins in European philosophy and theology and, in Latin, we find it in the writings of the first philosophers and theologians of the Christian era, starting with St. Augustine. The rationality of this mechanism and its relation to moral principles are some of the aspects implicitly considered by philosophical and theological reflection, begun in Greco-Roman antiquity and continued for centuries in the Christian era.

George Basiliade considers that both morality and religion are “expressions of human rationality subordinated to the original teleonomy of survival and continuity of the human species”. This assertion becomes a keystone in an original ontological projection that the author develops: *The fact that this one (morality) is imposed as an obligation of social origin and the other (religion) as a function of the intellect meant to ensure the cohesion of groups and communities does not constitute a plausible reason to dissociate them in relation to two different sources.* On the other hand, “any body of beliefs constituted in a religion contains, in a more or less obvious form, a set of moral prescriptions that go beyond the versatile and conjunctural character of conventional norms”.

The Romanian criminologist considers that some of the questions that have been formulated in relation to the rationality of the human being, on the one hand, and individual behavior, on the other, have led to the formulation of the following problems:

- a) whether and to what extent “free will” and “freedom of the will” presuppose certain normative benchmarks, according to which deliberation, choice and decision are exercised which precede the “passage to action”;
- b) what do these normative landmarks consist of?
- c) is it a matter of a predetermined moral content or a set of rules resulting from a very diverse social learning process, carried out in different social environments?
- d) how and to what extent does religious morality structure or dissociate itself from the conventional rules established by secular morality?

In the light of this matrix of problems, George Basiliade undertakes a broad analytical approach, from a diachronic perspective, in order to detect the fundamental elements of the constitutive paradigm of “free will” and implicitly of “freedom of will”.

The analysis begins with one of the ecclesiastical writers belonging to the first centuries of the Christian era, bearer of specific elements of Aristotle's thought. *This is the case of NEMESIUS (400 A.D.), who tries to explain the origins of the voluntary act, contained in the deliberation at the level of action (CONSILIUM), IN JUDGMENT (IUDICUM) and in the phase prior to choice (PRAELECTIO).* In turn, choice is another mixture in which deliberation, judgment and desire all come together. Choice is neither of these elements taken separately but their unity, just as man is the unity of soul and body. Deliberation proves the existence of free will, since the being that deliberates is clearly the support of the future facts subject to deliberation. It is reason that deliberates; it is therefore the root of freedom. The changing being, because it is created but capable of choosing rationally the objects of its will; man is free, God has created him as man ought to be, according to his nature, his acts depend on him; his good or bad deeds depend on these acts when he bears the responsibility of a life which ultimately depends on him.

At the same time as NEMESIUS, SAINT AUGUSTINE, consistent with his theses on "Divine Grace" and "original sin", considers that "free will" exists but is incapable of leading to faith, because it can only present the alternative of Evil and not that of Good. Human nature is corrupted by the concupiscence that has perpetuated human being and this drive has its origin in primordial sin. Thus vitiated in its substance, human nature is "massa peccati." "Man can only be saved by *Divine Grace*, which God grants at his discretion and only because of His infinite goodness".

This thesis, held as dogma by the Catholic Church in the Early Middle Ages, was also challenged by PELAGIUS by "denying the transmission of Original Sin and the role of divine grace and by affirming freedom of will, i.e. free will, conscience, reason, the idea that the essence of religion is moral nature".

Although the doctrine of PELAGIUS was condemned by the Council of Carthage, it "was continued with subtlety in medieval theological thought and we find it in the French philosopher and theologian Petrus Abelard (1079-1142)". He resiliently, despite the attacks of the Catholic Church, defends the fundamental rationality of the human being: "Man has the rational capacity to know God directly". From the perspective of the paradigm analyzed, "ABELARD's conception argues the rationality of the human being as the basis of free will or freedom of will and distinguishes

between vice and sin, between good and evil, according to the intention that led to the act (Ettiene Gilson, 1995). Vice is the tendency to accept what is not proper, that is to do something that should not be done or to not refrain from doing what you are not allowed to do. It appears as an urge to transgress the limits of what is permitted. In itself vice is not a sin, but an inclination towards sin, which man can rationally control. *The defeat of vice becomes for man an occasion of virtue. Sin does not consist in a proper inclination of the will.* Although our natural tendency may be to do evil, we do good, if we fight against evil, even when it dominates us. Sin does not consist in the result of the act itself, therefore in its materiality, but in not refraining from doing what should not be done, i.e. in acquiescing to evil. Acquiescing to evil is disregarding God and the intention to disregard him is the very essence of sin. *The delineations Abelard makes have an undeniable psychological value and highlight the psychological mechanisms of free will and especially the deliberation and choice for a good or evil action.* They reveal the determinant role of the intention to do the wrong thing when the will is free to choose an action in accordance with God's will. It is a point of view that does not focus on what generates it as a result of a choice and therefore an inner deliberation, i.e. the intention to commit evil.

But both good and evil are conditioned by the intention from which they result. Between the natural inclination of the will and the opposite result of the act, good lies - like evil - in the intention that governs the act. The act itself has no moral value other than that of the intention that dictates it and is not confused with its result.

A good intention is actually associated with a good deed, just as an evil intention is always an evil deed. In the case of good and evil, the morality of the deed is confused with the morality of the intention. A good intention is actually good. That is, it reflects what God wants man to do. On the other hand, not knowing the truths of the Gospel does not make every wrong act bad. Those who do not know the Gospel do not commit any wrongdoing, as long as they cannot realize its perceptions. They remain unbelievers who can be saved because of their good intentions.

At the end of this analysis, George Basiliade points out that he has presented only some of the conceptions that preceded and influenced the body of ideas in the 20th century. The thirteenth century, which after several centuries became the official doctrine of the Catholic Church, namely, the conception of Thomas Aquinas. At this point, the criminologist reveals

the importance of the debates of the time on the so-called dual form of knowledge of truth, namely the religious and the philosophical. Thomas Aquinas understood the sterility of such a contraposition for religious thought. One can speak of a difference of degree and scope, of comprehension and understanding, but not of an opposition. For Thomas Aquinas, "man as a spiritual being has two cognitive faculties, one is the act of a bodily organ, and it is natural that it should know things as they exist in individual matter; it follows that the senses know only particular things. The other is intelligence (understanding), which is not the act of a bodily act." Hence it follows that it is conformable to our nature both to know by intelligence beings, which indeed have an existence only in individual matter, and to know this being, derived from individual matter, by the concept of intelligence. It follows from this that, through the concept of intelligence, we can know these beings from a universal point of view, which goes beyond the faculty of the senses.

Basiliade considers that Etienne Gilson (1995) formulates a very useful clarification, namely that in Thomas Aquinas the term soul expressly includes reason. This is yet another argument in favour of the rationality of the human thesis as its ontological dimension. What are the consequences of this theological-philosophical position on the level of moral life? "Every being is good", Thomas Aquinas argues, "and goodness and being are really the same thing. They differ only in our reason. Since intelligence perceives being before the good, it is internal to the good. In this way the formative function of morality arises, because the good is desirable and is divided into three parts, namely, the honest, the useful and the agreeable, giving these three terms a distinct theological charge, which in part modifies their common meaning." We find in this passage elements of Aristotle's topology, where it is argued that only a free choice of will can lead to the commission of evil. For Thomas Aquinas, just as there is a physics of the sensible world, which allows one to reach God, considered the cause of the world, by rational means, and a revealed theology, which exceeds reason, so there is a natural morality, which directs human actions. "It is a morality based on the spontaneous orientation of the will towards what is good and on a divine grace which does not belong by itself to the rationally directed will".

Morality, as a natural guide, gives substance to practical reason, identifying with it. The natural tendency towards what is good becomes a stable state, a natural and immutable habitus, which divides itself into particular

precepts or rules of conduct, from which the rectitude of the will derives. "It seems natural that this propensity towards the good, in the Thomistic conception, is determined by the free will of God. But such overdetermination does not remove free will, but enshrines it as a faculty of human reason to weigh and choose the good." Freedom of choice implies freedom of the will to do or not to do a certain action, when reason and natural morality tell you what is good.

Basiliades believes that this is not a denial by Thomas Aquinas of free will and freedom of will, as some of his commentators have claimed. Freedom that does not know its limits ceases to be freedom, just as right ceases to be right when by its abusive exercise, it transgresses the limits imposed upon it.

Basiliade goes on to address the Reformation and later the Counter-Reformation, considering that the emergence of spiritual alternation in the history of culture is illustrated by a dialectic of the complementarity of European civilisation. It includes a contestation of what exists in order to uphold what is naturally contained, but forgotten or ignored, in the spirituality of an earlier cultural period. The Reformation is not only a rejection of papal authority, but a revival of an original Christian tradition, designed to remove the abuses of the Catholic clerical body and the hijacking of the meaning of religious life.

Martin Luther is the originator and most influential theorist of this religious protest movement. If the Renaissance brought about a transformation of the values of the axiological system of scholasticism, the Reformation seeks to update them by emphasising the decisive role of 'Divine Grace' in the salvation of the soul from original sin.

The influence of the doctrine of St. Augustine, which is very current in many of the religious institutions in Germany, is present in Luther's work. For him, the supreme authority is that of the Word of God as written in the Bible, and the key to its understanding is the teaching of Christ. Faith alone is the way of salvation, for by faith every believer proves his trust in God's steadfast love, thus responding to God's willingness to bestow His grace.

The Romanian criminologist points out that "what interests us on the subject of free will is the emphasis on the character of the inner living of the act of faith, as an individual, deliberate manifestation, in order to obtain divine grace and salvation from sins." The idea of sin is taken

from patristic thought and becomes a fundamental thesis of the Reformed Churches. Nor do the saints constitute a privileged and predestined category of divine grace and salvation. Their active religious life and intense love of God saved them from original sin. *Every Christian is a sinner who can be a saint, through the intensity of his faith in God and his desire to obtain divine grace. It is a form of manifestation of an autonomous and free will, which has not always been recognized in the theological and philosophical works or commentaries of Reformation doctrine.*

It is not an absolute freedom, which is only a theoretical construct, incompatible with a rational being. Absolute freedom is a contradiction in terms, since all freedom is restricted and conditioned by certain limits. By the fact that the will is an act of conscience and an elaboration of rational capacity, a dependence is established, which restricts the manifestation of absolute freedom. In this sense, the understanding of free will is a rational capacity, that reflects the possibility of weighing, deciding and acting in a certain direction, depending on a series of pre-existing conditions.

Basiliade therefore considers that Martin Luther's theories concerning the existence of free will or freedom of will can be interpreted as beliefs with meanings derived from the theological reasoning behind them, namely: a) human being is essentially marked by original sin; b) salvation from sin by divine grace is an act of God's will, which thus substitutes itself for the individual will; c) consequently, the human will is not free, and free will as a characteristic of conscience is inoperative and as such non-existent. All this reasoning becomes even more radical in Calvinism because of the doctrine of predestination, according to which some people are chosen by God to be saved, while others are rejected and doomed to eternal poverty. It is the narrow meaning of free will.

Subjecting these statements to a critical analysis, Basiliade considers that there is no plausible answer to the following questions:

- Why do people choose and act voluntarily, opting one way or the other (good-bad; right-wrong), according to their own conscience?
- Why do some people make faith as an inner experience a guide for all their behaviour, strictly adhering to the principles (moral maxims) that accompany this faith?
- Why should the choice of economy, hard work and the production of material goods, which are considered moral values, reflecting faith in a possible but uncertain salvation, not be the result of free will and

freedom will, understood in a much broader sense than the strictly theological?

Starting from these questions, the criminologist considers that the analysis of theological and philosophical views has associated free will with moral principles. Without this moral, religious or secular charge, free will would be a form without content, a "flatus vocis", a name that says nothing about reality. It would only reveal deliberation as a logical process reflecting the rationality of the human being. Yet it is precisely the moral substance on which this logical mechanism is exercised that makes up the content of the concept and gives meaning to the whole of the acts and processes of consciousness. Only in this way does free will become the main instrument of moral consciousness. It selects the set of values to which human behaviour is ethically related, be it happiness, pleasure, duty, faith, honour or perfection. Moreover, it selects not only the values of purpose, but also the means by which they can be realised and sustained, in other words the conduct consistent with the goals pursued.

In the absence of endogenous or exogenous causes which alter or remove the capacity for freedom of will and free will, free will is, following a long process of settling the contents of conscience, the main instrument for assessing responsibility for acts committed and for determining punitive or rewarding sanctions.

The understanding of how these aspects became components of a rationalistic paradigm that oriented the social reaction towards madmen, offenders or other types of moral deviance, is completed by George Basiliade with the analysis of the main moral doctrine, opposed to the Protestant Church, namely the Counter-Reformation or Catholic Reformation.

The Counter-Reformation originated in the Catholic Church a century before it was officially recognised by Pope Paul III.

It is continued in the following centuries and can be characterised by religious activism, involvement in social life on behalf of the underprivileged and ideological intransigence in combating the theses of the Protestant Church. The Counter-Reformation marks, at least initially, an era of religious conflict that culminated in the Thirty Years' War. The founding in 1540 of the Jesuit Order (Society of Jesus) with a doctrine in which religious meditation is coupled with quasi-military discipline of the members is the spearhead of the ideological offensive against the Protestant Church. The ideological theses of this reformist orientation within the Catho-

lic Church are of Spanish inspiration and are reflected in the so-called "spiritual exercises" prescribed by the founder of the Order, the monk and theologian Ignazio de Loyola.

George Basiliade believes that the "spiritual exercises" have major significance for the way freedom of will and free will are conceived from the point of view of the Counter-Reformation. Although free will does not appear explicitly as an essential component of human rationality, it nevertheless denies both the idea of man's eternal damnation as a result of original sin and the thesis concerning the predestination of divine grace and, implicitly, salvation. Through meditation, either assisted or unassisted, the sinner can be saved in spiritual exercises, adopting the model of Christ's life.

Basiliade explains the role of these rigorously conducted spiritual exercises. It is an intense reflection on the sins of one's own life, compared with the Christ model of life, with the passion of Jesus and with the constant reference to the power of God, who in his infinite goodness grants believers salvation from sin. The individual act of authentic faith is the result of the personal and in a way autonomous will to save sins. In the broad sense of the concept of free will one can speak of a deliberate choice for a living of faith, in which the principles of Christian morality and the believer's way of life are reflected. It is not excluded that in the inner effort towards salvation a mystical revelation of true faith and the existence of God may occur.

In this context, Basil formulates a number of epistemological considerations. In spite of those who strictly separate mystical knowledge from rational knowledge, we continue to maintain that, although different in the procedures of approaching truth, mystical experience constitutes one of the facets of human rationality. "The antonym of rationality is not mysticism, but irrationality brought about by pathological dysregulation of the cognitive and relational functions of the human intellect." The author emphasizes, by configuring a clear-cut cognitive, gnoseological vision: "authentic mysticism is a complementary alternative to human rationality and results from transgressing the limits of current understanding. This does not cancel out the reflective capacity of the human being, but on the contrary reveals, through a dialectic of complementarity, a dimension of rationality which is actualized in exceptional cases in the consciousness of the believer."

At the end of his analysis of the Counter-Reformation (Catholic Reformation) the author concludes: (a) the Counter-Reformation is not only a reaction to Protestant doctrine, but also a revival in the consciousness of the faithful of moral principles that have been forgotten for a long time; (b) it is the revival of a genuine religious background, in response to the criticisms of the Lutheran Reformation and its various variants from Calvinism to Pietism; (c) by emphasizing the role of individual spiritual exercises as the basis of religious living, it revitalizes the role of free will and freedom of choice in choosing the Christ model of life as the only way to salvation.

At the end of the day, we mention the author's note: „The remarks on free will and freedom of the will belong to us and are based on an understanding that goes beyond the strictly theological meaning with which these terms were used in the era to which we refer”.

Last but not the least, we believe that the issue of free will and freedom of will, debated with depth and Christian empathy by G. Basiliade remains a constant in the epistemological dimension of criminology and a foundation for the relaunch of the metatheoretical research of crime in the postmodern horizons.

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