

ROMANIAN COMMUNISTS AND THE INFRINGEMENT OF DIGNITY OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN BUCHAREST (1950-1952). A COLLECTIVE US REACTION

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Abstract: The present research is focused on two classified American and Italian diplomatic documents that point out the injunctions on the activity of the foreign diplomatic missions in Bucharest exercised by the Romanian Government (Securitate) and to the infringement of the diplomatic immunities and privileges by the same Government. There are described the spying techniques through wiretaps (45 microphones) and environmental recordings. The documents focuses on the direct pressures on the American diplomats and on the service passport staff in order to cooperate with the Securitate and the disappearance of 30 Romanian citizens who worked for the foreign diplomatic missions in Bucharest. The abuses were so great that the head of the Italian Legation in Bucharest asked the change of the whole staff and officials.

Keywords: Romania, United States, Italy, diplomacy, immunity

One of the least studied issues of the „obsessive decade”¹ is the activity and daily life of foreign diplomats accredited in Bucharest. When talking about this class of diplomats, we must differentiate between Socialist diplomats and those representing Western democracies, their allies or the nations within their sphere of influence.

While for most diplomatic representatives from pro-Soviet countries, professionally-speaking, the art of diplomacy was an absolute

1 1950-1960.

novelty, as they were not chosen based on their competencies or experience, but based on their social origins and profound obedience, diplomats sent to Bucharest from the other side of the “Iron Curtain” were professionals whose entire career path had been guided by it. Much like any long-practiced and experienced Western diplomatic apparatus, those sent to Bucharest were not only competent, but they were also recognised for their character. Being a diplomat or a civil servant on the East side of the “Iron Curtain” involved a series of personal deprivations, which could lead and even led to deprivation of liberty. Hence, diplomats needed high stress, pressure and offence resistance (freedom of movement, freedom of expression, diminished or even lack of contacts). What we could call the “nonconventional informative” dimension cannot be omitted from the internal job description of some of the Western diplomats sent to Bucharest. We would be naïve to believe otherwise.

Even under those circumstances, when those who came to Communist Romania were ready to accept a challenging professional life, the irreverence of the Bucharest authorities towards diplomatic etiquette and institutional appropriateness was so pronounced that, in January 1953, after years of pressure, Western diplomatic missions decided to officially protest against the institutional rudeness of the Communist regime in Bucharest. There had been a history of infringements of the privileges and immunities of the diplomatic corps mutually recognised by the Romanian authorities – Romania had subscribed to these regulations, but the Communist government refused to fulfil its responsibilities.² Infringements were not an exception, but the rule, which irritated the embassies or legations in Bucharest representing the following countries: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Egypt, Switzerland, France, Israel, Italy, Yugoslavia, Sweden, the United States, and Turkey. The situation was so tense that the US Legation in Bucharest³ decided to propose to the aforementioned diplomatic missions to draft

2 The problem was known at the time. There was also a theoretical training, even if of later date, introduced after the signing of the Vienna Convention that has been regulating diplomatic immunities. The internal guideline of the Romanian secret police agency, published by Lt Col Ion. C. Grecescu in *Studii și documente* vol. 9, august 1971, under the title *Utilizarea de către cadrele și agenții serviciilor de spionaj străine a imunităților și privilegiilor diplomatice, pentru culegerea de informații secrete despre Republica Socialistă România*, http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/studii_documente/Studii%20si%20documente%201971-09.pdf

3 Led by Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Harold Shantz, appointed on September 27th, 1952, he left post on August 30th, 1955.

a collective *note verbale* to make the Bucharest government aware of the fact that they had reached the limit of the diplomacies' tolerance toward the infringement of their diplomatic immunities. Chronologically, this pressure could also be a consequence of reorganising *Securitatea*, the Romanian secret police agency: "in September 1952 *Securitatea* is reorganised, being removed from the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and forming a new separate ministry – the Ministry of State Security. The Directorate for Foreign Intelligence continued being a priority, as it became the 1st Directorate. Its priorities still consisted in organising the espionage activity in the West – it mainly focused on the US, the UK, France and West Germany for the timely discovery of the aggressive intentions of capitalist states and in order to gather political and technical-scientific, economic, and defence documentary information."⁴

Detailed information on the episodes that led to these dissatisfactions is presented in a classified report sent on January 3rd, 1953, by First Secretary Giorgio Tiberi, chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Italian Legation in Bucharest, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Rome.⁵ The message covered three categories of related issues. The first one was of a rather technical nature, informing the Minister on the intention of the US Legation in Bucharest and the steps to be taken according to the instructions given by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs back in Rome. The second category concerned the offences and pressures that affected the diplomatic immunity of the functionaries working for the Western missions in Romania. Lastly, the third category, derived from the second one, was linked to the very structure of the Italian Legation in Bucharest, which required special attention, given the "unorthodox" pressure of the secret police agency and those of the Communist police/militia.

At the core of the document stood the problems included in the second category of information sent by the Italian mission in Bucharest. It included challenges still faced by diplomatic missions all over the world: illegally installed surveillance devices or telephone tapping inside or outside of diplomatic missions. Given today's technology, interception is a trifle, but at the time it was not easy, as oral conventional conversations could only be intercepted by entering diplomats' offices or residences,

4 Liviu Țăranu, *Ofițerii "ilegali" ai Securității, între folclor și realitate*, in „Cetatea Bihariei”, 2nd series, 2008, no. 1, p. 149.

5 The representative of the Italian Legation Alberto Calisse (March 14th, 1951 – May 22nd, 1955) was probably on a leave, as the letter was sent during the winter holiday.

which was illegal, being considered an infringement of diplomatic immunity. Wiretaps (at least 45 had been discovered by the time the letter was drafted) had been installed in the US and Austrian Legations, but also in the homes of US, Austrian, Turkish, and Egyptian diplomats. As to their location, the technicians working for *Securitate* seemed to prefer to install them close to doors and windows, and especially in the space between the pavement and the hardwood floor.

The Italian diplomat thought that neither the Legation nor the residences of the Italian diplomats had been omitted by the “wiretap placers of the secret police agency”, but a “debugging” campaign would not be easy and would require an extended period of time.

One of the methods used by the militia in order to pressure the missions accredited in Bucharest consisted in intimidating and threatening the Legation officials and staff, often Romanian citizens (auxiliary employees working as drivers, cleaning ladies, etc.), forcing them to disclose the activity of diplomats and heads of mission. By doing so, it was intended to establish, through these small officials, to establish a permanent and functional espionage network. In the opinion of the Italian diplomat, they forced foreigners to do so under the threat of not receiving an exit visa from the country, while Romanians were threatened with arrests and long-time imprisonment. It was practically a *sui-generis* arrest that could be extended for a long time under ambiguous conditions; the Romanian Communist authorities yielding only when they saw a potential direct or indirect benefit of the release.

The author of the letter gives the valid example of the Austrian Representative Office in Bucharest, perhaps the most exposed mission in this context. The information presented by the Italian diplomat seems to be obtained from within the Representative Office, as they are quite detailed (it was probably directly or indirectly provided by the head of the mission). It is thus reported that both the driver and a typist working for the Austrian mission confessed that they had been forced to provide information on the diplomatic activity of the Representative Office. As the two were Romanians, it was easier for the authorities to threaten and manipulate them but, as they had informed the head of mission on the danger, he knew how to proceed accordingly. The Austrian Representative Office in Bucharest provides an even more striking second example. It is the case of the secretary, a certain “Mrs. Stibora”. Born in Budapest, she had Austrian citizenship and had lived in Bucharest for some time, so

she was familiar with the capital and the country. Her employment status was defined in her official passport. In October 1952, while driving back from Predeal, Mrs. Stibora was intercepted by the militia and forced to get out of her car and get into another one. She was then taken to a militia station where she was asked to “collaborate” in the most vulgar sense of espionage: by “*providing information regarding everything that happened in the Representative Office that employed her, copies of reports and documents.*” And the demands did not stop there. The poor secretary was required to facilitate the reinstallation of wiretaps, after they had been discovered and removed by the head of the Austrian Representative Office in Bucharest Baumann and not only in what Westerners call the mission’s Chancery, but also in Baumann’s residence. And, to offer the whole package, Stibora was threatened with reprisals if she gave away the meeting with the Militia and their requests. These threats worked, but the effect was transient, as after two months, Mrs. Stibora could no longer take it and had indirectly revealed the truth to Baumann. The head of the Austrian Representative Office had immediately proceeded with the formalities for recalling the “compromised” secretary in Vienna, but the completion of the recall procedure was faced with an impediment: up to the moment when the Italian diplomat sent the letter to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Romanian authorities had been refusing to grant her an exit visa, as a first consequence of her betrayal.

Moving to a higher level of information, the Italian envoy informs Rome on a more serious case involving the holder of a diplomatic passport. He was not a member of one of the legations/embassies mentioned in the beginning of the letter, but a member of the most significant Legation in Bucharest, that of the United States of America. The information referred to the offenses brought to an employee (we do not know his diplomatic rank or function) called Montrezza—an American of Italian origins—for something that was common practice in the diplomatic services of the countries with a strong democracy: he befriended a young Romanian lady, and their relationship became serious. According to the letter, their relationship was evolving towards a marriage. Montrezza had had an absolutely normal and open relationship with the Romanian lady, introducing her to all his colleagues from the US Legation and inviting her to parties or receptions held at the Country Club. When his partner was sick, Montrezza paid her a visit. While he was leaving

her house, he was approached and stopped, with what seemed to be a pronounced lack of politeness by an “*agente della Securitate*”⁶. The talk that followed was quite simple: if he wanted her not to be arrested for the “crime” of having an American friend, he had to collaborate with the militia by providing classified information within the US Legation. But Montrezza immediately reported what happened to his superiors and was recalled to Washington right away. An investigation, probably carried by American technicians, revealed that 11 microphones had been installed in Montrezza’s residence.

Given the above, the temporary head of the Italian Legation in Bucharest considers that the diplomatic corps were threatened by these practices of the Romanian authorities, especially by those of the secret police agency and of the Militia apparatus, and that those who were not diplomats were more vulnerable and in danger of falling into the traps set by the repressive Romanian bodies.⁷

Given the fear, and even a terror toward local staff (more than 30 Romanian employees of foreign diplomats were reported missing) and toward foreign staff who entered the country using diplomatic passport, if

6 Regarding the Militia/Securitate ambiguity encountered in the text, it should be mentioned that “*people were recruited with the active support of the militia, within the militia units, where candidates were called or brought in under various pretexts, such as issues with their identity cards.*” Florian Banu, *Rețeaua informativă a Securității în anii ‘50: constituire, structură, eficiență*, in “*Caietele CNSAS, Revistă semestrială editată de Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității*”, 1st year, no. 2, 2008, p. 27. According to Alexandru Drăghici For the period of about a year when the Ministry of State Security operated, it was organised during the meeting of the Political Office of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Român, PMR) from September 2nd, 1952: “*The Ministry of Security (Ministerul Securității) will consist of: the body called today the General Directorate of State Security (Direcția Generală a Securității Statului), Militia, Security Troops, and Border Guard Troops (Trupele de Grăniceri). The Ministry of Internal Affairs will consist of: prisons, most of them organised as labour colonies, the State Archives and the Firefighters. The Ministry of Internal Affairs places great importance on the use of detainees for great construction projects.*” *Securitatea. Structuri-cadre, obiective și metode*, Vol. I, (1948-1967), Editura Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 2006, p. 65.

7 According to the information sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Simion Bughici to the secret police agency and highlighted by Mihai Pelin, the employees of the Italian Legation in Bucharest who did not hold a diplomatic passport were the following: Altieri Zanvetto, former head of the accounting office, Adriano Revel, the head of the passport office, Gaetano Squisito, the head of the repatriation office, Zoe Olivotto, office worker without specific tasks, Spiridone Fabiano, office worker of the passport office, Antonio Bontempi, telephonist, Pietro Bellina, telephonist and janitor, Luigi Segatto, janitor, Aristide Milleri, Alberto Calisse’s driver, Natale Zoldan, Legation porter, Giacomo Oleva, healthcare steward, and Oddo Bontempi, the minister’s valet.

the phenomenon was not discovered in time and could not be countered, it could bring enormous damage to the activity of Western diplomatic missions accredited in Bucharest and could annihilate their specific activity. In consequence, the letter requested “*sostituzione integrale*”, the replacement of the entire staff of the Italian Legation in Bucharest with new staff holding not an official passport, but a diplomatic one, in the shortest amount of time. This technical artifice had its legal reason, as the exit visa from Romania was easier to obtain for a diplomat than for the holder of an official passport (like Stibora). When he sent the letter, Giorgio Tiberi was the only holder of a diplomatic passport in the Legation. The residence of the military attaché Colonel Vittorio Cuneo was in Sofia, and he held multiple accreditation.

This problem with the diplomatic and official staff is a recurring issue in diplomatic relations during the “obsessive decade” and explains, on the one hand, the fever of changes in the Romanian legations and embassies and, on the other hand, the forced replica of the Western embassies and legations in Bucharest.

Most of the times, diplomatic documents reflect the attempt to overcrowd Romanian legations of the '50s, but Communist Romania did not agree with having as many Western diplomats in their legations in Bucharest. Nevertheless, we find the “mobility” of the Romanian diplomatic corps to be meaningful, “diplomats” being often in a certain country for less than a year, probably for fear of being deconspired. At the moment, there are several known cases of espionage within the Italian borders: driver Dumitru Dobre and press attaché Teodor Verche.⁸

It is true, however, that there are much more records of infringements of diplomatic immunities and privileges than those presented in this classified document, and these transgressions affected almost all Western legations, and not only them, as can be seen in the initial statement regarding the authors of the possible collective note. We hope that as documents from the archives of the ministries for foreign affairs of the countries represented in Bucharest are declassified, we will be able to verify and assert new and new challenges and infringements of diplomatic immunities by the secret police agency apparatus in order to highlight this unpleasant side of the Romanian foreign policy in the '50s.

8 Veronica Turcuș, Alexandru Ioan, Heltianu, *Un caz inedit de spionaj românesc în Italia (1955-1957): Teodor Verche, atașatul de presă de la Ambasada României pe lângă Quirinale în "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie George Barițiu din Cluj-Napoca"*, LIII, 2014, pp. 285-301.

ANNEXE⁹

LEGAZIONE D'ITALIA (tre copie)

Bucarest

RISERVATISSIMO-URGENTE

Telespresso N. 916

Indirizzo MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

=Roma=

Bucarest, 3 Gennaio 1953

OGGETTO: Immunità diplomatiche
Proposta di passo collettivo

Questa Legazione degli S.U.A. si è fatta promotrice di un passo collettivo, che dovrebbe essere eseguito dalle Rappresentanze diplomatiche argentina, austriaca, belga, bitannica, danese, egiziana, francese, israeliana, italiana, svedese, svizzera, turca, statunitense e jugoslava presso il Ministero degli Esteri romeno, per protestare contro le gravi, sistematiche violazioni dell'immunità diplomatica spettante alle rispettive sedi diplomatiche ed ai loro membri.

Mi è stato sottoposto un progetto di Nota Verbale collettiva, di cui invio qui unito il testo originale (all.1) e relativa traduzione (all.2). Il progetto di Nota è preceduto da alcune considerazioni confidenziali.

Mi sono riservato di far conoscere alla Legazione proponente il parere del nostro Governo sull'opportunità di aderire all'iniziativa ed, eventualmente, le osservazioni o modificazioni proposte.

Per opportuna informazione di codesto Ministero, aggiungo alcuni chiarimenti e notizie. Numerosi microfoni e manomissioni agli apparecchi telefonici sono stati recentemente scoperti presso le sedi della Legazione USA e della Rappresentanza Austriaca, nonché nelle abitazioni di vari diplomatici statunitensi, austriaci, turchi, egiziani, etc. La maggior parte degli apparecchi era istallata al di sotto del parquets, presso le porte o le finestre.

Non è affatto da escludere – è anzi assai probabile – che tali istallazioni esistano anche nella nostra Legazione e nelle abitazioni mia e dei nostri impiegati. Mi riservo di fare delle indagini, benchè non facili in proposito.

Quanto al sistema usato dalle Autorità di polizia d'intimidare gli impiegati e il personale di servizio perchè riferiscano sull'attività delle Rappresentanze e dei funzionari diplomatici, esercitando un costante spionaggio sulle sedi ed i funzionari stessi, esso è qui ben noto ed appunto a tale situazione mi riferivo quando, col mio rapporto n. 1674/818 dell'8 dicembre u.s., accennavo alla possibilità di ricatto

⁹ The documents are kept by Archivio Storico-Diplomatico, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Roma, the Affari Politici 1950-1957, Romania – 1953, pacco 1215 fond, document not paginated.

poliziesco nei confronti dei nostri impiegati, specie se la loro facoltà di uscire dalla Romania è pregiudicata.

Tipica si presenta la situazione della Rappresentanza austriaca, ove sono, per la loro stessa ammissione, obbligati a riferire alla polizia l'autista ed una dattilografa, romeni, mentre la stessa segretaria del Rappresentante, signorina Stibora, di cittadinanza austriaca, ma nata a Budapest e residente a Bucarest da molti anni, titolare di passaporto di servizio (in situazione quindi analoga a quella dei nostri impiegati locali) venne, nello scorso ottobre, fermata mentre tornava in auto da Predeal, costretta a scendere e fatta salire in un'altra vettura, accompagnata in un posto di polizia e quindi invitata a fornire informazioni su tutto quanto accadeva nella Rappresentanza dove è impiegata, copie di rapporti e documenti, nonchè a facilitare la reinstallazione dei microfoni che il dott. Baumann, suo Capo missione, aveva scoperto e inutilizzato nell'ufficio e nella propria abitazione; minacciata inoltre di gravi rappresaglie se avesse riferito di essere stata fermata. Soltanto con due mesi di ritardo essa si è decisa, dopo molti terrori ed esitazioni, ad informare indirettamente il suo capo, il quale ha cercato di farla partire per l'Austria, senza peraltro riuscire ad ottenere il visto d'uscita.

Caso ancora più grave è quello concernente il sig. Montrezza, un addetto statunitense di origine italiana, titolare di passaporto diplomatico. Egli aveva stretto una relazione abbastanza seria con una ragazza romena, con l'intenzione, a quanto sembra, di sposarla. L'aveva fatta intervenire a ricevimenti del Country club e presentata a tutti i colleghi. Essendosi essa ammalata, egli si recò a visitarla nella sua abitazione. Mentre ne usciva, venne fermato da un agente della Securitate, il quale, senza tante cerimonie, lo invitò, se voleva evitare l'arresto dell'amica, a collaborare con la polizia, fornendo informazioni riservate. Il colpo non è riuscito perchè il Montrezza riferì l'accaduto ai suoi superiori ed è stato subito richiamato a Washington. Nella sua abitazione vennero rinvenuti 11 microfoni.

Ciò premesso, ritengo che vi sia fondato motivo di dubitare che tali sistemi di pressione e di intimidazione possano essere esercitati su tutti, nessuno escluso, dei dipendenti di questa Legazione e che pertanto la loro sostituzione integrale con personale di ruolo munito di passaporto diplomatico, sia da considerarsi con carattere di urgenza.

Quanto al passo collettivo proposto da questa Legazione statunitense, gradirei essere messo in condizione di comunicare alla stessa le determinazioni del nostro Governo e le eventuali osservazioni o proposte di modifica alla bozza di Nota Verbale suggerita.

Qualora codesto Ministero decidesse di aderire al passo suddetto, potrebbe essere studiata l'opportunità di inserire, fra i vari oggetti di lagnanza, le difficoltà recentemente fraposte alla concessione del visto d'uscita ai nostri impiegati locali, tanto più che in analoga situazione si trovano alcuni impiegati della Legazione Svizzera e della Rappresentanza Austriaca.

ss Giorgio Tiberi

CONFIDENTIAL¹⁰

The attached draft note is intended for delivery in French. It is being submitted for the comments of every mission listed on the first page. All missions are requested to make all such changes or complete redrafting as they feel desirable.

Naturally, the greater the number of missions that will participate in some form of collective note to the Rumanian Foreign Ministry, the greater will be its effectiveness. Moreover, universality of presentation submerges each mission into the collectivity of all and thus reduces the identification of any specific mission with any of the complaints listed in the note.

There is frankly, little hope that any satisfactory response will be forthcoming from the Rumanian Government. However, it is felt that the protest will

1. provide an occasion for suitable publicity in non-Cominform countries about government methods and action behind the Iron Curtain;
2. alert in a dramatic fashion other diplomatic missions in other Iron Curtain capitals to the dangers confronting them;
3. add to the documentation already available for investigatory commissions of the United Nations or other organizations who are examining the question of diplomatic immunities and current world practices in this regard.

The draft note is intended to be delivered either in its entirety (all 7 pages) or else (if a majority of missions prefers) with the mission of the portion between the dashed lines from pages 3 to 6.

¹⁰ We do not know if this *note verbale* was sent. It was not found in the archive of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Bucharest, but it is known that Communist authorities refused to receive or destroyed diplomatic documents that were not convenient for them. In this respect, see Șerban Turcuș, *Diplomație sui-generis în Ministeriatul Anei Pauker. Refuzul unei note verbale a Nunțiatunii Apostolice (27 iunie 1949)*, in *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "George Barițiu" din Cluj-Napoca, Series Historica*, tom LVI, 2017, pp. 369-376

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The Legation of the Argentine Republic, the Office of the Political Representative of Austria, the Legation of Belgium, the British Legation, the Legation of Denmark, the Legation of Egypt, the Legation of the French Republic, the Legation of Israel, the Legation of Italy, the Legation of Sweden, the Legation of Switzerland, the Embassy of the Turkish Republic, the Legation of the United States of America, and the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia jointly present their compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic and have the honor to bring to the attention of the Ministry a situation which could only have occurred with the knowledge and support of certain Rumanian authorities and which constitutes a serious deviation from the obligations of a nation to diplomatic missions accredited to it.

During the past six months, a majority of the above-mentioned diplomatic missions has discovered – after intensive search and much effort – a large number of listening devices or microphones installed in their offices or residences and connected by wires under floors or through walls to listening posts in separate buildings or residences not accessible to the missions.

Up to the present time, the total of such hidden microphones actually found and removed is 45, and others, presumably, remain to be found. They have been discovered in bedrooms, offices, studies, living rooms and dining rooms. Some have given evidence of having been installed for several years; others only a few months, but the similarity of the installation techniques employed and the similarity of most of the microphones used were marked in all cases. It thus appears that they were installed as part of central plan affecting most of the diplomatic missions in Bucharest, and it is clear that this could not have been done without the complicity of some agency of the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic.

A second type of violation of diplomatic premises has come through the discovery that at least 8 of the telephone instruments supplied to diplomatic offices and residences have been so tampered with as to serve as transmitting microphones for all conversations held in rooms near them, even when the telephone receiver remained on the instrument. This tampering involves expert rewiring of the telephone which can only be performed in well-equipped shops. This obviously could not have been done without the participation of officials or employees of the Romanian Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.

In addition, the previously named diplomatic missions wish to call to the attention of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs another set of events which is causing them much concern collectively. They refer to the steady procession of arrests, taking place in 1951 and 1952, of Rumanian citizen members of the official and household staffs of the missions and of their various diplomatic officers. The missions are well aware of the position of the Rumanian Government that such persons, because they are Rumanian nationals, are completely subject to the laws and authorities of Rumania. The missions, moreover, accept this position. However, they cannot acquiesce in the further position of the Rumanian Government that such arrests, although fully within the competence of Rumanian authorities, are, at the same time, of no concern to the diplomatic missions affected.

In the two year period referred to, approximately 30 Rumanian citizen employees of the various diplomatic missions and their household staffs have been arrested and have disappeared without a trace. This represents a large percentage of the total number of Rumanian citizens not employed in diplomatic offices in Bucharest. Since the diplomatic missions concerned can assure the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that they do not knowingly employ criminals and that many of the Rumanians arrested have been honest and law-abiding employees of the their respective missions for many are, the missions can only assume that in many instances the principal reason for the arrests has been that these employees were in the service of the various diplomatic missions. Such action, clearly planned from a central agency of the Rumanian Government, could not have any aim other than to render more difficult the legitimate work of diplomatic missions accredited to the Rumanian People's Republic. It may be pointed out that all of the persons arrested are ordinary workers – clerks, book-keepers, messengers, translators, cooks, butlers, etc. – whose services are needed by the various missions concerned.

In addition to this method of intimidation of Rumanian citizens working for the various diplomatic missions, the latter cannot fail to point out that agents of the Rumanian *Securitate* have forced Rumanian employees of every Embassy, Legation and Diplomatic Office at one time or another to report on the activities of such missions and of their staffs and to carry out other tasks of an espionage nature. These attempts

at intimidation and a recruiting espionage agents have even extend on occasion to employees of some missions who are nationals of the mission's country; and in one case to such a national bearing a diplomatic passport.

The totality of these activities by Rumanian Government organs concerning, as they do, many attempts by a variety of methods to nullify the diplomatic immunity to which all diplomatic missions are incontestably entitled, gives rise to a serious situation which the Rumanian Government is requested to eliminate without delay.

The aforementioned Embassies, Legations and Diplomatic Offices protest this effort on the part of Rumanian Government authorities to penetrate the premises of the various diplomatic missions located in Bucharest, which, by international custom and law are inviolable from all interference by authorities of the country to which these missions are accredited. The missions concerned await with great interest an explanation by the Rumanian Government of how these occurrences came to take place as well as the assurances of the Rumanian Government that they will not be permitted to repeat themselves in the future.

The above-mentioned Embassies, Legations and Diplomatic Offices present to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs the renewed assurances of their highest consideration.

Bucharest

____ January 1953